商学院学术讲座——许年行教授、薛巍立教授
发布者:殳妮 发布时间:2026-11-02 浏览次数:18
日期:2026年11月2日(一)
地点:财科馆3楼EMBA教室
讲座一
时间:9:30-10:15
题目:人工智能与公司金融研究
主讲人:许年行,现任中国人民大学商学院财务与金融系主任,教授、博士生导师。主要研究方向是金融科技、气候金融和公司金融。先后获得国家自然科学基金“杰出青年科学基金项目”、“优秀青年科学基金项目”、“原创探索计划项目”和“重大项目”、全国优秀博士学位论文,入选国家级青年人才计划和中组部首批“青年拔尖人才”(国家“万人计划”),荣获中国教师发展基金会首届“卓越青年研究生导师奖励基金”。已在本领域国内外一流期刊Journal of Financial Economics、Management Science、Contemporary Accounting Research、Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis、Review of Finance、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《管理科学学报》等发表论文50余篇。入选2020-2025年“爱思唯尔中国高被引学者”。学术成果先后获得中国高校人文社会科学研究优秀成果一等奖、二等奖和三等奖、中国金融学年会、China International Conference in Finance(CICF)、China Financial Research Conference(CFRC)、The Chinese Finance Association(TCFA)等国内外学术会议优秀论文奖。
讲座二
时间:10:15-11:00
报告题目:Marketplace or Gatekeeper? Adaptive Governance in Reward-Based Crowdfunding
摘要:Reward-based crowdfunding markets suffer from severe information asymmetry because backers must fund projects before observing final product quality. Yet platforms differ greatly in how strictly they audit projects, and many do not use uniformly strict auditing. This paper studies when quality information asymmetry should be addressed through creator-side signaling and when it should be mitigated through platform audit. We develop a game-theoretic model in which the platform first chooses audit intensity and creators then choose funding goals strategically. The analysis shows that creator-side signaling and platform-side audit are endogenous substitutes. When audit is weak, high-quality creators signal quality through inflated funding goals, which reduce project success—the Success Rate Reduction Effect. Stronger platform audit can reduce such costly signaling and support pooling, but imperfect audit also allows some low-quality projects to pass review and creates a valuation discount for listed projects—the Valuation Discount Effect. Balancing these two forces, the platform’s optimal audit intensity follows an inverted-U pattern in prior market trust. As prior trust increases, the platform first remains a passive marketplace, then becomes a selective gatekeeper, and finally returns to a marketplace role. This pattern helps explain why platforms such as Indiegogo and Kickstarter can be open in early stages and tighten auditing during growth; it also suggests that mature platforms should scale back broad auditing once market trust becomes sufficiently strong. Audit should also vary across project categories: it is most useful when category trust is low and setup cost is high. Finally, relative to the Laissez-Faire and Full-Control cases, adaptive audit may lower average entrant quality, but when the funding barrier is not too high, it can still improve project success and backer participation. Overall, the goal of crowdfunding governance is to establish trust efficiently, rather than to maximize audit intensity.
主讲人:薛巍立,东南大学经济管理学院教授、博导、执行院长。 主要研究方向为品类与库存管理、数字化运营管理等,发表了包括Management Science、Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Transportation Science等在内的国内外主流期刊论文近50篇;主持了包括国家自然科学基金青年科学基金A类、B类和C类、国家自然科学基金重点项目在内的多项国家级和省部级项目。