苏州大学商学院学术讲座——黄庭亮教授

发布者:殳妮   发布时间:2026-01-14   浏览次数:10

时间:2026年1月20日 上午10:00

地点:东校区财科馆317会议室

题目:Optimal Liability Design for Medical AI

摘要:Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly integrated into medical decision-making, yet its liability implications remain complex, particularly when physicians differ in diagnostic skills and their quality is unobservable. This paper develops a principalagent model in which a social planner designs medical liability to regulate a physician with private quality information who chooses between a standard treatment, a personalized judgment-based treatment, or following an imperfect AI recommendation. Our analysis yields several novel insights. First, we show that the optimal mechanism under asymmetric information is surprisingly simple: a uniform, one-size-fits-all liability level for all physician types who deviate from the standard of care. Despite physician heterogeneity, this simple policy often achieves the full-information first-best outcome, particularly when standard care is reliable or AI is highly accurate. Second, the relationship between AI accuracy and optimal liability is non-monotonic. Contrary to common intuition, better AI does not always imply more relaxed liability. As AI accuracy increases, the optimal liability either decreases monotonically or follows an inverted-U pattern, depending on the uncertainty of the standard treatment. Third, asymmetric information does not universally reduce social welfare. Welfare loss arises only when standard care is unreliable and AI accuracy is too low; even then, its magnitude follows an inverted U-shape, initially increasing as AI complicates the regulatory problem, but declining as more accurate AI helps mitigate it. Finally, we find that information asymmetry is a double-edged sword in the presence of AI, and greater transparency does not benefit all stakeholders equally

报告人简介:

黄庭亮教授为田纳西大学哈斯拉姆商学院终身教授。主要从事商业分析、人工智能、数据科学、新商业模式、运营营销界面、供应链管理、服务运营、创新和社会责任运营方面的研究。在国际顶级UTD期刊Manufacturing& Service Operations Management、Marketing Science、Management Science和Production & Operations Management等发表文章近20篇。 目 前担 任 Manufacturing & Service Operations Management、 Service Science、Decision Sciences、 Naval Research Logistics和 IlSE Transactions副 主 编,Production &Opcrations Managemcnt资深编辑。黄教授获得2025年瓦莱特家族杰出研究员奖、2023年INFORMS数据科学研讨会最佳论文奖、2018年POMS威克姆.斯金纳早期职业研究成就奖、2018年度服务运营最具影响力论文奖和2015年威克姆斯金纳最佳论文奖等奖项。


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