时间：2026.4.3 下午14：00-17:00

地点：东校区财经科学馆三楼317会议室

主持人：权小锋 教授

【报告一】

时间：14：00-15：30

题目：When the State Turns Down the Power: Administrative Power Rationing and Firm Production in China

摘要：We study the real effects of China's 2021 administrative power rationing on manufacturing firms. Using an innovative plant-level measure of production based on satellite thermal infrared radiation (TIR) and the staggered adoption of city-level mandatory rationing, we implement a stacked difference-in-differences design and estimate that rationing reduces plant activity by 17.2%. The effects are robust to a wide range of tests and are stronger in plants operated by private firms. Firms offset the shock by reallocating production across facilities and front-loading output, yet exposed firms experience negative short-term stock price reactions and reduce long-run capital expenditures. Overall, our results highlight both the intended and unintended consequences of China's “dual control” energy policy framework, and show how these outcomes are shaped by the interaction between government intervention and market forces.

报告人简介：陈卓 副教授 （清华大学）

陈卓现任清华大学五道口金融学院副教授。陈卓博士的研究领域包括中国债券市场、中国经济、实证资产定价以及金融计量经济学，其学术论文发表于The Journal of Finance, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Financial Economics, Management Science, Review of Finance、《经济研究》、《金融研究》、《经济学（季刊）》等国际国内顶尖期刊。他的研究成果曾荣获多项学术奖项，包括The Journal of Finance维度基金优秀论文奖、SFS Cavalcade 固定收益Arthur Warga最佳论文奖、教育部高等学校科学研究（人文社会科学）青年成果奖、刘诗白经济学奖、青木昌彦经济学论文奖提名、PanAgora Crowell 纪念奖决赛入围奖等。陈卓博士拥有美国西北大学凯洛格管理学院金融学博士学位、杜克大学硕士学位及北京大学工学学士学位。陈卓博士还担任国家自然科学基金优秀青年基金和重大项目子课题的主持人。

【报告二】

时间：15：30-17：00

题目：Government Target-Based Revenue Manipulation and Its Impact on Private-Sector Firms

摘要：We examine whether governments manipulate fiscal revenues to meet or exceed official revenue targets and, more importantly, how such manipulation affects firms within their jurisdictions, focusing on the Chinese setting. Analyzing the distribution of fiscal revenue forecast errors, we document strong evidence of manipulation at the provincial, prefectural, and county levels, with these practices more prevalent among lower-level governments. Focusing on the prefectural level, we find that, when local governments are suspected of manipulation, firms pay higher taxes, are more likely to pay environmental fines, and exhibit lower valuations. These adverse effects are concentrated among nonstate-owned enterprises and in prefectures where political leaders face stronger promotion incentives, and they are more pronounced under hard targets than under soft ones. Consistent with reduced firm valuations, we find affected firms curtail future investment. Overall, our findings suggest that target-driven fiscal manipulation by local governments imposes significant costs on firms within their jurisdictions.

报告人简介：杨国超 教授 （复旦大学）

杨国超，复旦大学保险应用创新研究院教授、博士生导师，国家级高层次人才计划青年拔尖人才，中国和加拿大注册会计师主要围绕宏观的经济金融政策、中观的资本市场制度安排以及微观企业行为决策之间的互动关系展开研究。论文发表于《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《经济学（季刊）》、《世界经济》、《管理科学学报》、《中国工业经济》、《金融研究》、《会计研究》、Journal of Corporate Finance等国内外权威学术期刊。曾获得洪银兴经济学奖、教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果二等奖、湖北省社会科学优秀成果一等奖、China Financial Research Conference（CFRC）最佳论文奖、PwC3535论坛年度最佳论文奖等。主持国家社科基金重点项目、国家自科基金青年项目、教育部人文社科基金青年项目。撰写的资政报告被中办、国办、教育部、国家发改委、省委省政府等相关部门批示或采用。